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Resurrecting (Meta-)
Political Theology, or
the Abstract Passion
of Alain Badiou
Matthew Sharpe
' ... all unarmed prophets have failed',
N. Machiavelli, The Discourses.
Introducing Badiou's Saint Paul
Philosophy today is above all paralysed by its relation to history,
claims Alain Badiou in his Manifesto for Philosophy. Having long ago
abandoned the Platonic postulate of trans-historical Truth, Badiou
says:
At bottom, Hegel's famous formula still hangs over [it]: 'The
history of the world is also the tribunal of the world'. It can
be said that Nietzsche's genealogical method, just as
Heidegger's hermeneutic method, have only proposed
variants of the Hegelian apparatus on this point.1
1. A. Badinu, Mnllij'sluJi".l'liilusul'liy, ed. and introduction by N. Madarasz, New York, State
University of New York Press, 1999, pp. 114-15.
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Badiou's avowed intention is 'to tear philosophy away from this
genealogical imperative'.2 Perhaps because of this, one feature of
Badiou's theoretical resurrection of Paul in Saint Palll: Tile
FOlludation of Llniversaiisul is the absence of any reflection on the
history of the relation between Christianity and politics. Badiou's
'strange enterprise'3 in this book is of a different kind to Manifesto
for Philosophy. His reading of Paul operates by way of what he
might term - evoking his language - a two-fold 'subtraction'
from Paul's apostolic teachings. Firstly, Badiou invokes a parallel,
seemingly generic to our times, between the Roman Empire of
Paul's day and 'our contemporary situation'.4 Hence it is for
avowedly political reasons that Badiou looks to Paul. This is a book
about where we are now:
for me, Paul is the poet thinker of the event as well as one
who practices and states the invariant traits of what can be
called the militant figure ... [1]f today 1 wish to retrace in a
few pages this c01Ulection in Paul it is probably because there
is currently a Widespread search for a new militant figure ...
called upon to succeed the one installed by Lenin and the
Bolsheviks at the begi1Uling of this century.5
Secondly, as this implies, Badiou's political reading of Paul
operates by way of a formalization of Paul's position. In line with
the modern Averroeism of a Hegel,6 Badiou claims that Paul's
epistles give 'poetic' form to a political thought that can be re-
formulated in philosophical language:
[F]or my part, what we shall focus on in Paul's work is a
singular connection, which it is formally possible to disjoin
from the fable and of which Paul is, strictly speaking, the
inventor; the connection that establishes a passage between a
proposition concerning the subject and an interrogation
concerning the law·7
At stake in this two-fold operation is the possibility of
(re)constructing a political universalism adequate to today's world.
2. Ibdinu, Mnlli{c,;(o{<,r l'hi/"s"I,I"I, p. 115.
3. A. Bndioll, Saillt Palll: The FOl/lldaJio/l {y' Ulli'i.'f'l's{/li~'lI, tnms. It Br<lssicr, Stnn(ord, St'ilnfo)'d
University Press, 2003, p. l.
4. Ilndiuu, S"illl 1',,"/, p. Ii.
5. Ilnd inu, S"illl 1',,"/, p. 2.
Ii. d. S. I-Inulgnte, 1\11 1"lrodw/i,," to l-kS>'!: Freedom 7i'IIlh "lid /-lis/ory, 2nel eeln, Mnldcn,
IJInckwdl, 21l115, pp. 242-9.
7. Badinll, SlIillt 1',,"1, p. 5, elllphnsis aclelecl.
ARENA jOlll'lltl/no. 29/30, 2008
Resurrecting (Meta-) Political Theology, or the Abstf8ct Passion 775
Badiou does not deny the connection between the modern political
universalisms and Christianity 8S ch8rged by Nietzsche and others.
BadiOl! accepts it in full:
What is essential for us [in Paul] is how the paradoxical
connection between a subject without identity and a law
without support provides the foundations for the possibility
of a universal teaching within history.8
Badiou's wager is that Paul's elevation of pistis (faith), ('Ipis (hope)
and agape ('love') name
the invariant traits of what can be called the militant figure ...
the entirely human connection which fascinates me, between
the general idea of a rupture, an overturning, and that of a
thought-practice that is this rupture's subjective materiality.9
In Economy and Society, Max Weber raised 'charismatic authority' as
both an 'ideal type' of political Herrselwft and in response to his own
perplexity as to how political change is possible.10 In a similar vein,
Badiou is interested through Paul in the possibility of a radical new
beginning. Badiou argues that when Paul writes 'for you are not
under the law, but under grace [klwris]', in Romans, 6:24, we should
understand kharis as naming how, what he calls the 'event' of
Christ's resurrection, was radically unprecedented. Pauline pistis
for Badiou names the subject's declared lJ and 'charismatic' faith in
this unprecedented event.12 Hope or elpis is for Badiou that
subjective constancy that keeps faith with this fidelity, against the
whole world - and one's finite being as a 200n logon eellon
(speaking animal), as we will see.13 Agape, the greatest of these
three,14 names the 'universal power' that animates any 'genuine
truth event' for those ""ho have the ears to hear. It is what enables
Christians' 'disinterested' 'indifference' to the ethnic and other
differences that divide people/s, as well as their ability to address
them all. 15
8. l3ndioll, SlIilll 1'11111, p. 5.
9. Bndioll, 511;1111'11111, p. 2.
10. M. Weber, Ecol/omy nud Society. All OIlt/ill!' 1~"'lIfl'I'/lf(,tijll' SocitJ/tlSY, Berkeley, Univl'rsity of
Cnlifornin Press, 1979, PI'. 215-H1, 241-5, See "Iso R. Ikl1dix, M,IY \II/<'Iwr: 1\11 /11/"",'(11101
Pal'l mil , Cnrden City, NY, J)ollbledny AndlOr, '1962, I'l'. 29<)-307.
11. Bndioll, Snilll Pal/I, p. HH.
12. Bndioll, 511illl 1'11111, p. 77.
13. Ilndioll, 511illJ 1'11111, 1'.95.
'14. Cor., 1.13; Bnd iOll, SlIilll 1'11111, PI'. 1{(,-92, 57-M.
'IS. Bnd ioo, SO;1I1 /'llIiI, pp. <)9-104; A. nnd iOll, 101/,;(,.: 1\ II EsslIY Oil 1/1" [llIiI"rsJIIII";II:~ 0( "p;!, tr""s.
P. I-Inllwnrd, London, Verso, 2002, PI'. 4lJ-SIJ, 53-5.
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In The Ticklish Subject, Slavoj Zizek notes that religion does not
form one of the four conditions of philosophy - art, science, love
and politics - which BadiOlI inventories in Being and Event. 16 It is
notable that in Badiou's 2003 Preface to the English translation of
Metapolitics, where he reflects on his essays of the previous decade
on these 'truth procedures', his Sail1t Paul is not mentioned.17 ln line
with Badiou's own thought, if only in this much, I will argue that
Badiou's 'strange' or exceptional enterprise18 of resurrecting Paul
in Saint Paul indicates the truth of his conception of politics. And it
is Badiou's 'thought' concerning politics alone that is my concern.
This article draws on resources not generic to the existing
reception of Badiou, much of which is devoted to the work of
comprehension or proselytization. I will argue that, although
Badiou argues in Saint Paul that his philosophy 'disjoins' the
political truth from Paul's Christianity, the opposite is closer to the
truth. I would suggest that Badiou's thought is much more
Christian than he knows and, so, much less generically political
than he believes, or is widely taken as being.
Governing my reading is the observation that Badiou is correct
when he asserts the doubly exceptional status of Paul's apostolic
teaching in Saint Paul. The Pauline teaching of resurrection was
scandalous from the standpoint of Jewish Law.19 It was an acosmic
'folly' from the standpoint of the Graeco-philosophical thought of
the Roman Empire.20 Unlike the other two great monotheisms, the
Christian prophecy of Paul was also singular in its being a
prophecy of agape, not Law (11011105).21 Paul does not descend or
ascend from his revelation on the road to Damascus with two
tablets. The interpretation of Law was for this reason never to
become the highest sophia for the mediaeval Christian
philosophers, unlike their Jewish and Islamic contemporaries. The
history of Christian thought that Paul initiates is instead largely
structured around the attempt to reconcile the conflicting demands
of agape and 11011105, the city of god and the cities of men.22 In Martin
16. S. Zizek, TIll' Tickl;,;" SlIbjecl: T"e AI>';1'111 (mire of Political OllloloS-'/, New York, Verso, 1999,
p.141.
17. A. B~diou, Mdal'0lilic,;, tr~ns. J. B~rker, London, Vcrso, 2(){)5. pp. xxxii-xxxiii.
18. B~diou, Sailll 1',,"1, p. 1.
19. 13~diou, S"illl 1',,"1, pp. 56-7.
20. l3~d iou, S"illl 1'11111, p. 56.
21. l3~d iou, Sailll 1'1111/, PI'. R6-'J2.
22. S~int Augustine of Hippo, Cily cU' Clld Icxtr~cls], in W. Ebenstcin ~nd A. Ebcnskin, Cn·"t
Polilic,,1 T"illk<'l''; I'I"tll III till' I'n'sl'lIl, 6th edn, Orl~nd(l, FI(lrid~, H~rcollrl Courl, 2001, PI'.
JH7-'JJ, 'j 'J6-H.
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Luther's terms - to which I will return - a Christian thought of
politics is concerned to distinguish the affairs of the Church from
those of 'worldly kingdoms', rather than generating a science of the
latter. 23
Thinking of this intrinsically strained relation between Christian
prophecy and the historical world, Hegel put an arresting
contention concerning the politics of Christianity in The
Phenomenology of Spirit. For Hegel, Christianity belongs to what
Badiouians might call the same 'sequence' as ancient Stoicism and
scepticism (an issue to which I will return). What initiates this
sequence in thought, though, is a withdrawal from the political
struggles and miseries of this world. This withdrawal is
undertaken by the defeated slaves, who were put to work by the
masters who had risked their lives in the desire for recognition.
Stoicism and scepticism each enact a devaluation of the body and a
correlative valorization of the internal 'freedom' or 'eternity' of
thought,24 Yet, in a famous description of the Christian subject-
position which anticipates Badiou's 'not [merely particular] ... but
[also universal]' formula to describe the Christian subject,25 Hegel
describes early Christianity as characterized by an 'unhappy
consciousness'. This consciousness
knows that it is the dual consciousness of itself as [internally
and in Christ] self-liberating, unchangeable, and self-
identical, and [as embodied] as self-bewildering and self-
perverting, and it is the awareness of this self-contradictory
nature of itself. The unhappy consciousness is the
consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory
being.26
Far from formulating the 'numericality' of progressive 'political
sequences',27 to be blunt, this article's provocation is that what
Badiou's thinking about politics gives voice to in unprecedented
language is nothing more unprecedented or 'evental' than the
invariant passion of such an unhappy consciousness. lf such a
23. M. Luther, 'Seculor Authllrity: To Whol Extenl It Shlluld Be Obc'yed', in W. Ebenstcin ond
I\. Ebensle;n, Crl'l1l Polilicnl Tlti"k('/":, Plnlo 10 II/(' I'n':,e"', PI" 30H-HI.
24. C. W. F. Hegel, P/"'"o,,It"IOlogy orSpiril, trnns.A. V. Miller, Oxford, Oxfurd University I're~s,
'1 \/77, 1'1" l20-5.
25. Bodiuu, Snil,1 I''''d, PI'. 63-4; d. Bodiuu, £II,ic:" p. 4H,
26. Hegel, /'/1<'''01111'''0100'''/ of Spiril, p. 126,
27, Bodiuu, Mt'lol,,,lilic:,, p. 150; l3adioll, I"ri"ill' TIIOlIo"ltl: 71'1I11t o"d lite 1"'1,,,·,,10 pltilo:,opl,y, Irnns.
ond cd. O. Fl'lthom and J. C1emL'ns, Lundun, Cunlinuum, 21l1J4, p. 72,
ARENA jOl/rnnl JlO. 29/30,2008
278 Matthew Sharpe
criticism attracts the polemical charge of 'Phariseeism' from Badiou
or his supporters, this will be the cross the critic, as opposed to the
master, will have to bear.
I. Method: left Behind/the Philosopher's Rough Ascent
Politics has nothing to do with genius (action is something
else). Human affairs are complicated in detail but simple in
principle. Social justice can easily be achieved without an
ingenious philosophy.
Albert Camus, in Combat, 24 November 1944.
Invoking the title of the best-selling novel by Tim La Haye, we
might say that what is most question-worthy for Badiou's thought
about politics is what it can say concerning those 'left behind'.
These are the individuals who do not 'wager' on fidelity to the
truth event, whether the resurrection of Jesus Christ or whatever
else. Feltham and Clemens put this problem nicely. They comment
that one could be forgiven at first glance for comparing Badiou's
political thought to a Mormon doctrine. 28 As in Mormonism,
Badiou's categories set up a sharp distinction between those who
do not hearken to the call of the Event 'and on the other side ... the
new elect ... of faithful followers'.29 Having raised this political
consideration, however, Clemens and Feltham immediately leave
politics behind. They revert instead to metaphysical concerns:
'However - and this is crucial - there is no predestination in
Badiou's account',3° Unless we accept that the thought of a political
elect is impossible without the thought of predestination, the
question of whether Badiou's thought does not look towards a
charismatic new elite or vanguard (sans predestination) remains.
The problem with Badiou's politics can be brought into sharper
relief by looking to the history of Christian political theology that
Saint Fa ul inaugurated. In particular, the singular political theology
of Martin Luther reads as strangely contemporary besides Badiou's
work. Luther was a figure who, long before Badiou's Saint Paul,
proposed his own return to Paul and the early Church. Luther, like
BadioL1, aimed to 'subtract' the key address of sola fide and sola
21J. O. Fe/thom and J. Clemens. 'An Inlroduction 10 Alain Bodiou's Philosophy', flll/lli/1' TllollgII/:
'/b'l/ll/lld IIII' li"flll'll /0 /)IIilo~OI)II!I, p. 7.
2lJ. Feltham and Clemens, 'An Introduclion 10 Alain Badiou's Philosophy', p. 7.
JO. Felthal1l ond Clemens, 'An Inlrnducliunlo Aloin Bodiou's l'hilnsnphy', PI" 7-R
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scriptum from the 'gangue' of the later mediaeval Church.31 Yet
Luther's own political writings in no way sanction an
emancipatory this-worldly politics on the strength of his new
emphasis on the individual's direct relation with the higher Truth.
When it comes to this-worldly politics, Luther's prescriptions
hearken back to the cardinal doctrines of Augustinianism, and
ironically resemble a work contemporary with his own, Machiavelli's
The Prince.32 Luther promotes the desirability of a sharp (re-)
separation between 'secular authority' and the 'kingdom of heaven';
But perhaps you will say, since Christians do not need the
secular sword and the law, why does Paul say to all the
Christians, in Romans XIII: 'Let all souls be subject to power
and authority?' And St Peter says 'Be subject to all human
ordinances' ... To such a one we must say: It is indeed true
that Christians, as far as they themselves are concerned, are
subject to neither law nor sword and need neither, but first
take heed and fill the world with real Christians before
ruling it in a Christian and evangelical manner. This you will
never accomplish, for the world and the masses are and
always will be unchristian, although they are all baptised
and are nominally Christian ... For these reasons these two
kingdoms [of heaven and earth] must be sharply
distinguished.33
The point is, a 'subtractive' Christian appeal to the freedom of
thought from secular 'tyrannies'34 does not by itself legislate any
political consequences. At the least, it does not prescribe any
meaningfully progressive political consequences. Luther's own
reactionary politics, and that of subsequent Christian political
theologians up until Carl Schmitt, illustrate something else. They
illustrate that thought about politics founded on a transcendent
Truth will always also face the need to negotiate the disjunction
between this thought and the shared lives of 'the animals of the
City',35 as per the famous Platonic eikon of the cave in Republic VII.
Notably, this founding eikon of political philosophy is rightly cited
31. d. Bndiou, M{'/tl!,,,'ilic~, p. 142.
32. SnintAugustinc of I-lippu, Cily 11' Cod Icxtrncts!, in Ebcnskin nnd Ebenskin, pp. 1~7-9n.
33. Luther, 'Seculnr Authority: To Whnt EXknt It Should Be Obeyed', in Ebenstein nnd
Ebcnslein, pp. 311l-11.
34. Luther, 'Seculnr Authority: 'Ii) Whnt Extent It Should Be Obeyed', in Ebenstein nn(\
Ebenslein, p. 316.
35. Ilndiou, Elhics, p. 5'1.
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by Badiou at the very outset of his essay 'Philosophy and Politics',36
One thing it indicates is that the philosopher or the prophet who
makes the rough ascent out of polis and the doxni of ordinary
mortals must also go back down (kntnbnteil1) to those left behind, if
only to turn their souls around. And herein lies the political rub, or
the question about the relationship between politics and
philosophy.
Now, to contend that Badiou's resurrection of philosophy lacks
adequate sensitivity to the complexity of the relationship between
philosophy per se and politics - or what we might call the
'politico-philosophical difference'37 - would seem to miss the
mark. Badiou is a student of Althusser, who always maintained the
'relative autonomy' of different disciplines and their specific
theoretical objects.38 Badiou is accordingly careful in Manifesto for
Philosophy and elsewhere to 'delimit' the scope of his resurrected
Platonic philosophy.39 Philosophy, Badiou emphasizes, does not
itself produce new truths.4o It is limited in its role to 'seizing' and
proclaiming what he calls the 'there are' of the truths, which, when
they arise in rapturous events like the Christian resurrection, arise
elsewhere: in les generiques of politics, arts, science and love.
Philosophy performs this epistemic operation with what he calls
the 'pincers' of argument and the 'fictions' of rhetoric.41
Philosophy's task is to think these generic truths in their
'compossibility'.42 (Apologies to new readers for the inevitable
recourse to Badiou's technical language here. It is necessary to
establish what is at issue.)
Badiou provocatively claims that most of what passes for
philosophy in today's world, from Wittgenstein to Den'ida, is
actually so much sophistry. The later twentieth century, for Badiou,
saw intellectuals undertake a guilt-ridden withdrawal from
philosophy.43 The principal rationale for this sophistic withdrawal
was the overblown notion that 'philosophy - and philosophy
alone' was 'accountable for the sublime or repugnant avatars of the
political in the [twentieth] century': namely, the total regimes of
36. Badiou, Inrinit,> Tllonsllt, PI" 69-70.
37. On this question, see M. Sharpe, •A Question of Two Truths? Contemporary Remark> on
Pnrrllesin and the Politico-Philosophical Difference', PnI'I'II<'sin, no. 2, 2007, PI" lJ9-lDlJ
3lJ. d. Bad iou, Melnpo/itics, pp. 58-67.
39. Badiou, Mnnifesto JOI' Plli/osopl/y, p. 27.
40. Badiou, Mnnifesto JOI' Plli/osoplly, PI" 123-4
41. Badiou, Mnnifesto JOI' Pllilosoplly, PI" 123, 124-125, 141-2.
42. Badiou, Mnnif<'sto.f<n·Plli/osoplly, PI" '124, 141-2.
43. Badiol1, Mnnif<'stojj)1' Plli/osoplly, PI" 116-1IlJ.
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Left and Right.44 With and despite this polemical attack, Badiou
argues later in Manifesto for Pililosopily that 'the essence of terror', if
not 'every empirical disaster[,] originates in a disaster of thought'.45
What is this disaster? In a way that evokes Heidegger's critique of
ontotheology or Kant's dialectic in the first Critique, Badiou claims
that 'terror' flows from 'a substantialization of Truth'.46 This is
what Badiou calls in his Etllies the 'absolutization of the power of
truth'.47 In such cases, philosophers elide what Badiou calls the
liminal 'void' of Truth as he sees it. This void is, or should properly
always be, 'the background on which truths are seized'.48 The result
of trying to 'fill in' this void with positive ideational content is that:
[a] triple effect of the sacred, of ecstasy and terror thereby
corrupts the philosophical operation, and can lead it from
the aporetic void that sustains its act to criminal
prescriptions.49
Interestingly, religion - the subject of Badiou's Saint Paul - is
nam.ed by Badiou in 'The Definition of Philosophy' to formalize
this 'disaster' of thought.50 Drawing on these elements in Badiou's
argumentation, Clemens and Feltham write:
The relationship between philosophy and politics [for
Badiou] ... is thus one of conditioning or dependence.
Philosophy is no longer sovereign. lt is as if philosophy had
finally heard that cry addressed to it for decades, a cry
voiced by so many artists, scientists, activists, and lovers
whose activities it has deafly appropriated from on high, the
cry 'SHUT UP AND LISTEN!'51
If we are to decide about Badiou's philosophy and politics, the
question is this. What it is that Badiou's philosophy ileal'S or rather
listens for when it turns its newly uncovered ears towards ta politika?
Bacliou's neologism for what his philosophy 'thinks' from and
about politics is 'metapolitics'. Badiou defines metapolitics in the
following way:
By 'metapolitics' 1mean whatever consequences a philosophy
44. IJndiou, /l'llll/ili·slo./"" /'I>ilos0l'I>y, PI'. 29-32.
45. IJndiou, Mlll/ifl'SIO fO,. PI>il>,s0I"'y, p. 131.
46. IJndiou, Mlll/iji'slo ./i,,. PI>ilosol'I>y, p. 131.
47. IJnd iou, EII>ics, p. 85, sec p. 83.
48. IJnd iou, MIII/ili'sfo fO,. PI>i/osol'I>y, p. 143.
4Y. IJndiou, II/jil/ifl' TflOIISl>I, p. 168.
50. Ilndiou, MIII/ili's/o./il/· PI>i/o.'ol'l,y, p. '143.
51. Ilndioll, 1'~/il/i/1' TIIOI/Sl>/, p. 33, enpit"l.' in originiJl.
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is capable of drawing, both in and for itself, from real
instances of politics as thought. Metapolitics is opposed to
political philosophy, which claims that since no such politics
exists, it falls to philosophers to think 'the' politica1.52
Each of the terms and phrases here deserves careful exegesis. The
first thing to note concerns Jason Barker's attempt to position
Badiou's metapolitics as a critique of authoritarian-cum-National
Socialist thinker Carl Schmitt.53 Does not Badiou here set his back
against the concept of 'the political' with which Schmitt's name
remains associated? In fact, when Badiou attacks the attempt to
think 'the political', his target in Metapolitics is Hannah Arendt,
whose heterodox republicanism is a very different thing from the
bellicose decisionism of a Carl Schmitt. In fact, 'real instances of
politics' are for Badiou no more a constant and inalienable feature
of human existence than 'the political' (as the 'real possibility of
physical[ly] killing' the enemy groundlessly decided by an
absolute sovereign) is in Schmitt's Concept of the Political. The stake
of the latter book was of course to defend the threatened domain of
'the political' from liberal decadence. Real instances of 'politics' are
comparatively rare, Badiou agrees with Schmitt. And our liberal-
democratic world is increasingly one in which traditional political
philosophy's deafness to 'real instances of politics' has been
institutionalized to the tawdry tune of neo-liberal managerialism
and omnipresent consumerism.54
So what, then, are the 'real instances of politics' that Badiou's
metapolitics discerns, in contrast to previous political philosophy?
Badiou has something very particular in mind. He restricts the
name 'politics' to what he calls 'the subjective reality of organised
and militant action'.55 Such actions, to bring things together,
presuppose exceptional truth events of the order of the
resurrection, which turned Saint Paul around on the road to
Damascus from zealotous persecutor of the early Christians to the
father of the One True Catholic Church.56 In fact, Paul's subjective
fidelity to the resurrection event is for BadioLl a privileged avatar of
such a 'real instance of politics', as noted above.
52. Bodinu, Mdnl'ofitic>, p. xxxix.
53. See J. Porker, 'Introduction' to Ilodinu, Mdlll'"filic>, p. vii. In fact, the pilradigm of 'politicol
philosophy' in Mdnl,,,li/ic> is the loter Arendt, See Bodinu, M,'/nl'oli/ics, PI'. 10-25.
54. Badinu, Mc/nl',,'ilic>, p. 152; d. esp. C. Schmitt, Till' Co"cel'l o/llI,'I''''i/icIII, trans. G. Schwob,
New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1<)7(" PI" 1<)-37.
55. Bodinu, Mf'lnl'0litics, PI" 10-11.
5(,. Badiou, SIIi,,' /'11,,1, p. '17.
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Badiou's claim in Mctapolitics, as in his Being and Event, is that
any historical instance of politics 'worthy of the name'57 involves
what he calls four 'multiplicities'. These are, in his language, 'the
infinity of situations; the superpower of the state; evental ruptures;
[and] militant prescriptions, statements and actions'.58 This then is
a strictly formalistic account of politics. In the final and 'most
important' essay of Metapolitics,59 Badiou goes so far as to provide
a metapolitical'definition' of politics that, remarkably, turns out to
be wholly 'numerical' or mathematical in fonn. 6o 'Believe it or not',
as Roffe says,61 the definition reads as follows:
0, E, n(E), n(n(E)) -+ 162
where:
0= the infinity of the situation63
E= the infinity of the state64
E> 0 ='the infinity of the state of the situation ... summoned
by repression and alienation, because it supposedly controls
all the sets and subsets of the situations'65
n(E)= the emergence of a 'universalizable' collective whose
prescription 'measures' or delimits the 'errant' infinity of the
state
n(n(E))= the work of the militant collective 'under the
conditions of freedom of thought/practice opened up by the
fixation of the statist power [i.e. n(E)]'66
We will have to return to this definition (especially, as exemplary,
the thought: E > 0). Yet the singularity of its very forn! qua
mathematical in the history of political ideas should be noted from
the start. Because many profound insights have appeared bold to
the common sense of their days, it does not follow that everything
57. Bndiou, Me/0l'0/ili,.,;, pp. 10-11.
SR. Undiou, Mellll',,'ili,.,;. p. 21.
59. Bod iou, Me/0l',,/ili,.,;, p. xxxvi.
(,0. Bndiou, Md0l'0lilic,;, p. 150.(,1. J. Roffe, ·('os[· or ('re-Cl"iticol? On the Absence' of thc Conccpt of Copitolislll in Aloin
Bocliou's Mel0l',,/ili,.,;', Unpublished Mnnuscript, 2005, p. 3.
(,2. Bodiou, M"'0l'",ili,.,;, p. 151. I will return [0 this prescntly.
63. Badinu, Mdlll'"lilic,;, p. '144.
M. Uodinu, Md0l'",ili,.,;, p. 144.
65. Bndinu, Me/Ill',,'ilics, p. '147.
66. Badinll. Meill/'Il/ilic,;, p. '150.
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that appears bold must be profound. Tn part criticizing his teacher
Plato ('for while both are dear, philosophy requires us to honour
truth above our friends',67 Aristotle observes in the opening book of
his NicllOlI/achcan Ethics that 'precision is not to be sought for all
[subject matters] alike in all discussions'. As Althusser and others
also taught, the complexity of the world would seem to demand a
methodological pluralism:
For it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in
each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject
admits; it is equally foolhardy to accept probable reasoning
from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician
scientific proofs.68
Aristotle was here anticipating his fundamental distinctions, made
in Book VI, between phronesis69 and sophia, 1101lS, and epistcmc. The
former, sometimes translated as 'practical wisdom', is a type of
deliberation concerning transient things potentially changeable by
human action, and the result of its 'practical syllogisms' is practical
actions. The latter forms of enquiry (sophia, I70US, epistcmc), by
contrast, are purely theoretical or contemplative. Their objects are
'first principles' (as in nOlls),70 and the forms of unchanging or
necessary things like mathematical truths or natural laws. These
forms of enquiry hence do not issue in, nor can they without
qualification guide, any practical actions. All the branches of
political science, Aristotle thus stresses - although it is in one way
the most 'god-like' knowledge71 - are and can only be so many
reflective specifications of phrol1csis.72 The reason for this is that
they deal with those variable things and institutions capable of
being changed by voluntary human action (prohaircsis),73 guided by
competing visions of human excellence (arCte).74 To try to treat ta
politika, however novelly, with the methods one would use to
formalize mathematical truth is, for the tradition of political
reflection beginning with Aristotle, to have made a category error
of the first order. Its substantive price will necessarily be a
conceptually violent levelling out of political phenomena per se, if
(,7. Aristotle, Niciloll/lIcllenll E111ics, tmns. W. D. Ross, London. Ilrit"nnic".IY52, book I, eh. vi.
6H. Aristotle, NidlOl/lt,c1lt'nll Eillics, 13k I. eh. iii.
6<). Aristotle, NicllOlI/ncllt'lI11 Eillies, Ilk VI, eh. 1'.
70. Aristotle, Nicilol/lt/cllt'l11' Eillics, Ilk VI, eh. vi.
71. Aristotle, NidlOl/lOcllt'nl/ Eillics, Ilk I, eh. ii.
72. Aristotle, Nicl,olllllcllt'l11l Eillics. Ilk VI, eh. viii.
73. Aristotle. NidlOlI/lIcllt'lI11 Eillics. Ilk III, eh. i-vi.
74. Aristotle. Nidwl/lI1c!"'II11 E11,;es, Ilk I, ch. ii nnd Ilk VI, ch. xiii.
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not the type of inhuman prescriptions 'from reason alone' that
shape Plato's knllipolis (ideal or 'beautiful' city) in the Republic.
Badiou is keen to stress his distance from the more historically
grounded political thought of the tradition that runs from Aristotle
via Machiavelli and Montesquieu into historical materialism. This
is one object of the central 'Speculative Disquisition on the Concept
of Democracy' in Metnpoltics?5 So perhaps I can be accused of
bringing foreign categories to bear on Badiou's metapolitical
thought. Whether such a defence of BadiOl! could stand or not, the
radical novelty of Badiou's numerical definition of politics, duly
stressed by himself and his followers, at least demands the
following: an enquiry as to whether Badiou's 'metapolitics' does
not rest on a fundamentally mistaken prioritization of theoretical
knowledge over the categories and considerations generic to
political praxis. As Badiou himself would direct: there is a
philosophical question, one of Truth, to be decided. And in order to
decide it, we need to pay attention to the generic realities of politics
and the order of truth to which politics corresponds.
Let us consider, then, how in 'Philosophy and Politics' Badiou
takes up the indisputably political category of 'justice', a category
particularly central to any progressive leftist politics. For Badiou as
for the Greek tradition of political thought, justice involves a notion
of equality?6 Nevertheless, if this much is clear, what Badiou means
by equality is controversial. Badiou specifies that equality for him
means nothing like the competing visions of distributive or
retributive parity that political thought and life have delivered us
since Plato:
It is very important to note that 'equality' does not refer to
anything objective. It is not a question of an equality of
status, of income, of function, and even less of the
supposedly egalitarian dynamics of contracts or reforms ...
Moreover, it has nothing to do with the social. It is a political
maxim, a prescription. Political equality is what we declare
under fire of the event, here and now, as what is, and not as
what should be?7
The equality in play for Badiou in his meta political conception of
justice is 'strictly subjective, without passing through any objective
75. Bodioll, MI'I"IJ(1lilic~, PI'. H3, H5.
76. Bodioll, II/jil/ile T/lOl/gIII, PI'. 70, 71.
77. B"diou, 14il/itc TII"l/gIII, PI'. 71-2.
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mediation'.7s In other words, justice, as Badiou conceives it, does
not concern who gets what share of the social product, how
material wealth is to be produced, or how questions of differential
merit and competing claims to desert or recognition are to be
decided or rewarded. Badiou's conception of justice instead recalls
the specifically 'declarative' dimension of Pauline pistis (where one
must declare one's faith) in his Saint Paul?9 Badiou's key example of
what he means by justice comes from the French revolution. It hails
from another Saint, Saint Just, and his notion of 'public
consciousness'. Badiou cites Saint Just's declaration before the
French National Convention in April 1794: 'May you have a public
consciousness, for all hearts are equal as to sentiments of good and
bad'.so The equality in play in Badiou's justice, it is clear, concerns
a certain state of mind, heart or thought about the equality of all.
This is why it can 'here and now' declare the equality of all, no
matter how things actually stand materially or politically. Indeed,
as Badiou insists, radically:
The difficulty with most doctrines of justice is that they seek
a definition of justice and then they try to find means for its
realisation. But justice ... cannot be defined. Equality is not an
objective for action, it is an axiom of action.s1
What this axiom of action might embody or issue in, given that it
abstracts from any 'objective mediation', including the
consideration of political ends to be pursued on the basis of our
equality, is difficult to define indeed. It seems we are being
presented here with ,m abstraction from material conditions and
political considerations that makes Kant's formalistic moral theory
seem dourly materialistic. But could we not again be moving too
quickly, and missing Badiou's point? I-lave we not been told, after
all, that Badiou's metapolitics intends exactly to rescue the
specificity of real instances of politics from what, in a standard way,
passes for political action and the methodological imperialism of a
philosophical heritage that has for too long claimed to speak
politics' truths from on high?
To answer, let us ask directly: from what perspective does Badiou
declme these challenges to our inherited understandings of justice
78. Bodintl, Mclal'0lilic,;, p. 27.
7'J. Bodinll, Sailll Pool. pp. 1i7-1i.
SO. Bod inti, III/Illill' Thollghl, p. TI, cmphosis oddcd.
81. Bodinll, IlIfillill' Thollglll, p. 72.
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and equality? And, more precisely, is this perspective truly a
perspective that would enable Badiou (and all of us) to grasp politics
as a gel1erique of human experience, without subordinating it to our
own alien agendas?
In response to these questions, Badiou is characteristically clear
and distinct. Badiou's 'Speculative Disquisition on Democracy'82
sets itself the unusual, but surely philosophical, task of considering
whether 'democracy' is or is not a category 'worthy' of
'speculation'.83 To be direct: this is not a question many militants,
or any other political agents, can be expected to have reflected
upon for themselves. In Metapolitics Badiou talks about his aim in
terms of the difficult, but again surely inescapably philosophical,
end of 'seizing the intellectuality of a politics', despite the times.84
'Politics and Philosophy' ends by defining 'justice' as 'the name by
which philosophy designates the possible truth of a political
procedure'.85 The issue of the relation of politics to philosophy,
Badiou tells us, is whether any really-existing political orientations
happen to be 'worthy of submission to philosophy under the
category of "justice'" or 'are worth our trying to seize the thought
specific to them via the resources of the philosophic apparatus'.86
Once more we can suspect that the militants Badiouians praise
might look at this concern of their master and blink. And what is it
that Badiou promises us, should we, with him, 'submit ["justice"]
to the test of singular statements ... [which] bear forth and inscribe
the egalitarian axiom in action'? As it turns out, nothing more
generically 'of the polis' than the following:
it is by means of such a figure that philosophy assures, via its
OWI1 names, the inscription of what our time is capable of in
eterl1ity.87
To be ironic, one can picture, reading Badiou's account of the
relationship between philosophy and politics, a bunch of
philosophers in a panoptical Biblioleque Nalionale eagerly
monitoring 'the animals of the city', hoping to espy something
worthy of their thought. There is a serious point behind the jest,
82. In (l wny Blll'kcr dcscribl'S liS 'somcwhnt cnvnlicr' in J. Borker, 'Introduction' to BadioLl,
MeJn/,,,litics. This is whnt we shnll htlvC to sec.
R3. Bodioll, Ml'Inl'"lilics, p. llll.
R4. Bodioll, Ml'Illl'lililics, p. 45.
R5. Bodioll, II/JIll ill' TlIIII'SIiI. p. 70, emphosis odded.
86. Bodioll, {I/JlI/ill' TII"I/glIl, pp. 71,74.
117. IJodioll, Ml'Illl'"lifics, p. 75, emphosis odded.
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though. It is that, protestations aside, the real instances of politics
that Badiou's philosophy would humbly 'hear' turn out to be only
those that meet Badiou's philosophically-shaped concern for what
he calls truth events. They have nothing to do with the categories
and concerns that shape historical agents' own generically political
concerns. Badiou's 'rough ascent' from doxa towards the
philosophical Truth is also a radical 'cut' from historical political
experience. Indeed, as we will see, the radicality of this break both
recalls and finally trumps Hobbes' embrace of Gassendi's atomist
physics to justify his authoritarian politics in Leviathan.
So we now have to turn directly to the issue that is thus raised:
namely, what happens to all of those other seemingly political
actions and agents who are left behind by this metapoliticall
philosophical reduction of the political?
II. Substance: The Left Behind/'Thought' and Historical
Terror
Should anyone become the ruler, either of a city or of a state
... if he has no sure footing in it ... the best thing he can do in
order to retain such a principality ... is to organise everything
in that state afresh build new cities, ... destroy those
already existing, and move the inhabitants from one place
to another far distant from it, to leave nothing in the province
intact, and nothing in it, neither rank, nor institution, nor
form of government, nor wealth, except it be held by such as
recognise that it comes from you.
N. Machiavelli, The Discourses,
Discourse 26.
The Stoics were at the beginning of the sequence of thought that
Hegel tells us led to the unhappy consciousness of the early
Christians. Withdrawing from the Imperial Roman times in which
they were fated to live, the Stoics assigned the unique dignity of
men, a kind of 'infinitude', to the unbound, internal freedom to
think. As Hegel writes, with Stoicism:
[Wje are in the presence of self-consciousness in a new
shape, a consciousness which, as the infinitude of con-
sciousness or as its own pure movement, is aware of itself as
essential being, a being which thinks or is a free self-
consciousness ... In thinking, I am free, because I am not in
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an other, but remain simply and solely in communion with
myself ...88
In a surprisingly similar way, Badiou argues in 'Philosophy and
Politics' that the one common feature of all the political events
worthy of being 'seized' by philosophy in the way discussed 'is
that from the people they engage, these orientations require
nothing but their strict generic humanity'.89 The form of this
thought at least is classically humanistic. More rupturous is that
Badiou specifies that what is generically human is the capacity to
'think'. Here is Badiou: 'equality means that a political actor is
represented under the sole sign of his or her specifically human
capacity ... [and] the capacity which is specifically human is that of
thought'.90 Once again, Badiou's resurrection of philosophy seems
to sail very close to a recasting of politics in its own elevated image.
Badiou sees nothing strange or problematic in terming politics itself
a 'thought', or even a 'truth procedure'. As we saw above, its entire
worth for him comes from how politics happens to be one condition
of philosophy, alongside falling in love, the production of great art,
and scientific discoveries (see later).91 In what amounts to a very
radical rethinking of the Marxist category of praxis indeed, as
Feltham and Clemens comment,92 'Politics as Thought' is for these
reasons the title of Badiou's essay in Metapolitics about a man whose
example he tells us 'sustains' his own intervention, Lazarus93:
Politics is a thought. This statement excludes all recourse to
the theory/praxis pairing. There is certainly a 'doing' of
politics, but it is immediately the pure and simple experience
of a thought, its localisation. Doing politics cannot be
distinguished from thinking politics.94
Well may Badiou register in 'Philosophy and Politics' how, for
Plato, 'philosophy knows that it is incapable of realising in the
world the truths it testifies to' because of the 'irreducible
complexity of political circumstances'.95 Every political philosopher
88. Hegel, PllcllOlllcllology of Spi,.it, p. 120.
89. Badioll, II/fillik TllOllgllt, p. 70.
90. Badioll, II/fillitc Tilol/gilt, p. 71.
91. Badioll, Mclo/,olitics, pp. 141,152; d. Badiou, Metnl,olitics, pp. 33-40.
92. Fcltharn and Clemens, 'An Introduction to Alain Badioll's Philosophy', p. 31.
93. d. Badiou, Melnpolitics, pp. 52, 128.
94. Badinu, Melnpolitics, p. 46, emphasis added.
95. Badioll, Mctnpolitics, p. 96; d. Badioll, Metapolitics, p. 87; Badioll, Mnl/ifcsto fa,. Pililosoplly,
pp.131-33.
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from Plato onwards has recognised that 'science itself began -
with mathematics - with the radical renunciation of every
principle of authority', and so is an abstraction from the
complexities of political life.96 Many have faced persecution on
exactly these grounds. With this said, it seems very much as though
Badiou has today become the first philosopher to suggest that the
founding theoretical renunciation of the institutions and power
relations constitutive of political life could operate as the paradigm
for 'real' political action itself. This, in any event, is the singular
possibility we have to investigate now.
Badiou elaborates the 'thought' he means in his Ethics. In
Badiou's defence, the way 'thought' is framed there is as different
in its content from the 'free thought' of the historical Stoics as it is
from the deliberative reasoning of political philosophy97 Here
Badiou's thought is much closer to Saint Paul, if we must invoke
the ancients to discuss something truly unheard-of. 'Thought',
Badiou says, names 'that by which the path of a truth seizes and
traverses the human animal ... [it is] the specific mode by which a
human animal is traversed and overcome by a truth'.98 Again, the
'truth' here pertains to radical, rapturous events: whether in
science, love or art. Of course, Badiou has to concede, there is more
involved in theoretical inquiries and 'thought' than the type of
epistemic break involved - to use one of Badiou's key examples-
in Paul Cohen's discovery of 'the central paradox of the theory of
the multiple ... a discernible concept [of] what is an indiscernible
multiplicity' .99 Nevertheless, as per his definition of 'justice' taken
from Saint Just in Metl1politics, Badiou does take any political 'truth
procedure' worthy of philosophical attention to be, primarily,
'axiomatic':
There is no political orientation linked to truth which does
not possess an affirmation - an affirmation which has
neither a guarantee nor a proof - of a universal capacity for
political truth. Here thought cannot use the scholastic
%. Bndinll, !Vlt'II1/,,,lil;C;;, p. 14.
97. d. 1'. Hnllwnrd, 'Trnn;;lntnr', Intrndllction', in Badillll, Elhic;;, pp. xxxiii-xxxv.
98. Bndinll, II~rill;lcTho//ghl, p. 71, cmphasi, ndded.
99. BndinLl, MI1//lft,,;to J'II' /'hilo,,"/,hy, p. HIl; Bndinll, MCII1I'olilic;;, pp. 14-15. Agnin reflecting on
the specifically Il1eol'('/;e,,1 ilclivil)' of science in order to mnke his eliSt', in 'I\gllinst Politicnl
Philosophy', in Melopolilic$, he wriles: 'Scientific st<ltclllt..'111s art..' llccurntcly exposed in their
entirely to gellernl criticism, independently of the subject of enullcintion, ilnd in i.1CCOrdilllce
with explicit norms thill nre ncct..'ssible by right to whomsoevcr tnkt's the trouble to grnsp
them' (Bndioll, M<'II1/,,,litic.', p. 14).
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method of definitions. It must use a method which proceeds
via a comprehension of axioms. lOll
What Badiou is hypostasizing here is a metaphilosophical insight
already arguably grasped by the Greeks. The 'first principles' of a
system of deductive thought can ultimately not be demonstrated
within the system they precondition. 101 That would be like
someone jumping over their own shadow. These axioms must
instead be posited by an axiomatic decision in order that enquiry
can proceed. Thinking again of what Badiou has to say about
politics, it would seem, then, that Badiou's novel wager would be
to assert that any 'veritable political sequence'1Ll2 is most akin, of all
the diverse species of human activity, to the activity of positing
such groundless first principles in theoretical enquiry. Real
instances of politics for Badiou will always centrally involve the
positing by agents of axioms, which, like the first moment when
people fall in love, 'punch a hole' [trollee] in the situation that
preceded the event.103 And this is why it becomes meaningful for
Badiou to call politics a 'truth procedure', over the heads of
political agents and the categories (good, evil, just, unjust ... ) they
use to conceptualize their political actions. The 'ethics of truth' that
such a 'truth procedure' in each case involves, Badiou continues,
always reduces to but one question. The Pauline echoes of this
question also are clear:
[H]ow will I, as someone, continue to exceed my own being?
How will I link the things I know, in a consistent fashion, via
the effects of being seized by the not-known?
One might also put it like this: how willI continue to think?
That is, to maintain in the singular time of my multiple-
being, and with the sole material resources of this being, the
Immortal that a truth brings into being through me in the
composition of a subject ...104
So now we are in a position to pose adequately the political
question with which I opened this essay: namely, what happens to
those individuals 'left behind' by the truth event? In terms of the
100. Badinll, Mcl0l'olilic,;. p. 72.
101. cr.• fnl' example. Aristotle, Nicllllll/tlC"I'OIl EII,ie,;, p. Vl.l'i; cr. Iladinll, Mllllijj·",O jill' P"ilo,ol'''Y,
p.12Il.
102. Badinll, II/Jill ill' T"oIlS"I, p. 72.
103. l3adinll, EI"ic" p. 43.
10'1. Iladin", O"ie,;, p. 50.
AI~IONA journo! no. 29/30, 2008
292 Matthew Sharpe
previous quotation, for so long as such 'Immortal' subjects
(whether single individuals or militant collectives) walk amongst
us, how will these evental subjects think about and act towards
others? It is true, as Badiou stipulates, that 'the egalitarian axiom'
- that all are equal qua thinking animals - is 'inherent in a
veritable political sequence'.IOS Yet we saw in Part I that this
egalitarian axiom does not imply any concrete distributive ideal,
and is equally silent concerning the means to attain any said ideals.
So, will the action of the evental subject, whether one individual or
an elect vanguard be bound by any calculable principles at all
towards those left behind? Or are we being asked, in the name of
philosophical truth, to simply accept an 'elective indiscernibilty'
about the actions of post-evental Badiouian subjects? Is this just one
less palatable implication of what Badiou means by 'Politics
Unbound' in Metapolitics that real men or thinkers should fearlessly
embrace?106
To broach this question, we should raise again in more detail the
comparison between Badiou's metapolitical thought and the
political theology of Martin Luther. As we saw earlier, Luther
conceived the 'internal' capacity for conscience, if not 'thought',
afforded Christians as a wholly trans- or apolitical thing. What,
then, was the other, this-worldly side of this thought so central to
the burgeoning of modern individualism? As Nietzsche noted,
God's gift of conscience to each man equally in no way prevented
Luther from speaking of 'this world' at large and the majority of its
people with a remarkably venomous tongue. For Luther, the mortal
animals who live in the kingdoms of this world - and more
particularly the peasants - are not much more elevated than a
menagerie:
It is out of the question that there should be a common
Christian government over the whole world, nay even one
land or company of people, since the wicked always
outnumber the good. Hence a man who would venture to
govern an entire country or the world with the Gospel would
be like a shepherd who should place in one fold wolves,
lions, eagles and sheep together and let them freely mingle
with one another and say, Help yourselves, and be good and
peaceful among yourselves; the fold is open, there is plenty
lOS. Bndioll. II/fil/ill' Thol/g/,t, p. 72.
106. d. 1'. J-1nllwnrd, 'Trnnslntor's Introdllction', in I3ndioll, Ethics, PI'. xxxiii-xxxv.
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of food; have no fear of dogs and clubs. The sheep, forsooth,
would keep the peace and would allow themselves to be fed
and governed, but they would not live long; nor would any
beast keep from molesting one another. I07
Now, the point here concerns how Badiou talks about that vast
majority of events, processes and actions that the rest of the world
describe as 'political'. For when he does, Badiou's language is
scarcely less evangelical than Luther's. As Stavrakakis comments,
Badiou's rhetoric is typically 'heroic, excessive, even quasi-
religious'.lOB Badiou denounces as 'Thennidoreans',109 or even as
'philosophical Pharisees',11o thinkers like Hannah Arendt who
claim that the business of forming doxai about competing human
goods is essential to politics (versus philosophy, love, art or
science). Indeed, Badiou describes the vast majority, if not all, the
processes that take place within the cities of the world as 'repulsive'
or explicitly 'subhuman'1l1:
The vast majority of empirical political orientations have
nothing to do with truth. We know this. They organise a
repulsive mixture of power and opinions. The subjectivity
that animates them is that of the tribe and the lobby, of
electoral nihilism and the blind confrontation of
communities. Philosophy has nothing to say about such
politics, for philosophy thinks thought alone, whereas these
orientations present themselves explicitly as unthinking, or
as non-thought. l12
In other words, when it comes to those of us mortal animals 'left
behind', Badiou rehearses nearly literally what Pierre-Andre
Taguieff has identified as the gnll1dmotif of the reactionary anti-
modernism113 running from de Maistre and Nietzsche (as we might
add) to the world's Murdoch Press today. Echoing Carl Schmitt
again, Badiou can, for instance, only see in modern liberalism's
'J07. Luther. 'Seculor Authority: To Who! Extent II Should Be Obeyed', in Ebenstein ond
Ebenstein, p. 3IlJ.
1118. J. Stovrokakis, rlil' tocnllioll Lefl: l',ycllOnlloly,is, rlil'ory, I'olilics, Edinburgh, Edinburgh
University Press, 2007, p. '135.
109. Bodiou, M,'fnl'"lilics, 1'1'.124-40.
110. Bod iou, M,·lnl'"lilic.', p. 111.
11'1. Bod iou, flliics, p. 13.
112. !Jadiou, IlIlillite TliollSlil, p. 70; Bad iou, Elliics, p. 31.
113.I'.-A. '1:1guieff, 'The Tmditinnolist Porodil\111 - The Horror of Modernity ond Anti-
Libel'<llism', in L. FCJ'ry tlnd A. J~eni1l1l (('(is), ltVII.'I l'V" Are Not Nid::,cI'I'Ii//:-;, Chic<lgo,
University of Chic-0l\o Press, 1\1\17, frol11 p.15H.
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sanctification of 'freedom of opinion' and the promotion of
democratic will-formation in an open public sphere:
special rights for falsity and for lying ... The laziness of those
who are sheltered from every norm and see their errors or
their lies protected by right.
It is indeed clear that, apart from those who believe that
saloon bar philosophy or conversations between friends
constitute 'the very essence of political life', debate is political
only to the extent that it crystallises in a decision ...114
In this decisionistic light, it might seem little wonder that in
'Speculative Disquisition on Democracy' Badiou argues that the
founding question of political philosophy - what makes for a
good state - is actually beneath the dignity of his metapolitics. J15
'The State does not think', Badiou thinks.116 Instead, it is given over
to the all-too-mundane tasks of fulfilling the functions associated
with material production, social reproduction and crafting a
working consensus of opinions. ll7 And what has this to do with
philosophy? The historical state is to be aligned with 'the subjective
orientation of interest' of subevental human animals. 118 Eschewing
the roots of this term in the Latin inter-est, moreover, Badiou thinks
of 'interest' in a pessimistic, almost neo-liberal manner: as 'what
Spinoza calls "perseverance in being" ... the conservation of self' as
a suffering animal. 119 Indeed, regarding the modern state's social
democratic provision of welfare and its 'ethics committees',12o
Badiou concurs with today's neo-liberal and reactionary choruses
that the state promotes an insipid, 'negative and victimary
definition of man'121:
[T]he status of victim, of suffering beast, of emaciated, dying
body, [which] equates man with the animal substructure ...
reduces him to the level of living organism pure and simple
... To be sure, humanity is an animal species. It is mortal and
114. Badinl1, MI'lfll'olilic.<, PI'. 15, 14-'16; Badiol1, Eillies, PI'. 31-4; cf. I. Dcvilsch, 'Democracy's
Conll'nt Thinking Politics with Badioll and Schmitt', COllllllllllicnlivlI & C0:O;lIil;OIl, vol. 36,
nos. 1-2, 2003, PI'. 46-R.
115. Badioll, Ml'Ifll'olilics, PI'. 82-4.
'116. Badinl1, Ml'Ifll'"lilies, p. 87, emphasis added.
'117. Badinl1, II~fillill' 1'11011:0;111, p. 73.
'118. Badinl1, IIIJIllill' TllolIglIl, p. 70.
119. Badinl1, EII1i($, p. 46.
120. Badinl1, fll1ies, p. 15.
121. Badinl1, l:/I1i($, p. 16.
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predatory. But neither of these attributes can distinguish
humanity \,vithin the \-vorld of the living ... this 'living being'
is contemptible, and he will indeed be held in contC/1/pt ... 122
The measure of Badiou's pessimistic, unworldly estimation of the
state per se, however, can only be fully measured by returning to
the mathematical definition of the 'numericality of political
sequences' introduced in Part I above. In this formalization, the
'thought' £ > a was defined by BadiOl! in these terms: 'the infinity
of the state of the situation ... summoned by repression and alienation,
because it supposedly controls all the sets and subsets of the
situations'.]23 As promised, it is now time to think through what
this 'thought' involves.
At the outset of modern political thought, Hobbes sought, by
recourse to the Biblical symbol of the leviathan - who 'none is so
fierce that dare stir him up']24 - to establish the absolute sovereign
power of early modern monarchies. With the exception of Carl
Schmitt, with whom he is often compared, Hobbes presents the
most radical, authoritarian estimation of the power of the modern
state, or prescription concerning this. By recourse to his set theory,
however, what does Badiou do? He effectively posits a political
state of infinitely more fearsome capacity than Hobbes' hopes or
fears drew him to envisage. Badiou's 'thought' about the 'infinite'
repressive power of the state turns upon a wholesale, and prima
facie absurd equation of the political state with the 'state' in set
theory. We know this because he tells us that the thought £ > a is
shaped by the Zermelo-Fraenkel power-set axiom in mathematical
set theory.125 In that theoretical field, this axiom 'counts' all the
possible subsets of any mathematical 'situation'. It in this way lists
all the possible relations between the constituent elements. 126 If we
follow Badiou in equating all the empirical interchanges between
122. Bodiou, Elilies, p. 12, emphosis odded.
'123. Bodiou, Mdl1!'olilie,;, p. 147,
]24. Job, 41: ]0; d. J. Hobenllos, 'The Horrors of Autonomy: Cor! Schmitt in English', Tlie Nl'll'
(OIl';I'I'1'"li"i';lIl, Irons. s. W. Nichol,;en, inlm, R. Wulin, Londun, Blockwell, ]989, pp,129-3·1.
]25. Bod iou, Melo!'o/ilies, pp. '144,14(,-7. Roffe writes: 'This tronsition is effecled by Bodiou, in
L'Elrl'd I'E"I'III'IIII'II/ in Ihe following "'oy, "tthe very poinl he [Bodioul conws to nome Ihis
mcti1structuring of the situlilinn: "From hl'reill 11(1el", due to i1 mL'lllphol'icilJ i1f(inity with
politics thot "'ill be exploincd in Medil"tion 8, I ",ill IeI'm ,;111/1' of III<' silllol;oll thol by mmns
of which the strllcture of iI situntinn - of oily structured pl'L'Sentillion whcllsllcvel" - is
cOllnted as olle ... " There nfL' 1\-\'0 interesting things nbnullhis lillIe sentence hen.', ilnd more
besides. In fact, it is the sl'nlence thnt introduces the entire rl'lnlio!l bl'l\\'l'en ontolng)' nnd
politics in Ilocliou', thought .. .', Roffe, 'l'ost- or Pre-Criticol? On Ihe Absence of the Concept
of Copitalisll1 in Aloin Il"diou's Mdapolitics', 1'. 4.
126. l3adioll, A~l'IlIl'(I/iJil:S, p. "1"7.
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individuals within a 'state' with the possible subsets within a mathe-
matical situation, we can, with Badiou, accordingly 'mathematically
demonstrate', without recourse to politics or history at all:
that this excess [in the power of the state over individuals] is
not measurable. There is no ans\·ver to the question about
how much the power of the State exceeds the individual, or
[this 'or' condensing the entire methodological issue here-
MS] how much the power of representation exceeds that of
simple presentation. The excess is errant. The simplest experi-
ence of the relation to the State shows that one relates to it
without ever being able to attain a measure of its power. 127
If we abstract for a moment from the veneer of profundity carried
in the ancient dream of being able to mathematize everything - or
the chic of the latest 'master thinker' we seem to need from the
continent - this truly is an astonishingly oversimplified, if not
absurd, conception of 'really-existing' politics. Such an estimation
of the power of the state is also, we might note, very good news
indeed for the forces of reaction, and the powers that be, who might
have had good historical reasons to think their power an altogether
more qualified, a posteriori thing.
One thing we can say with certainty about Badiou's thought on
politics is that the link between theOl'ia and praxis, which Marxian
political theory had sought to forge by promoting engaged,
immanent critique of sociopolitical formations, is left far behind. If
the power of the state is postulated as infinite, it follows directly
that there is no immanent space, process or potentials within the
world as it is that the Left might look to with a view to
progressively transforming the existing order. Unsurprisingly then,
we find that Badiou's examples of 'veritable political sequences' are
wholly of the order of violent, abortive or openly reactionary
ruptures against the world as it is:
In the order of the political, the event is concentrated in the
historical sequence which stretches from about 1965 to 1980,
and which has seen the succession of what Sylvain Lazarus
calls 'obscure events'; that is: obscure from the point of view
of politics. They include: May 68 and its aftermath, the
Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Iranian revolution, the working
class and national movement in Poland ('Solidarity').128
127. Bnclioll, Melnpo/ilics, p. 144.
128. Bnclioll, Mnl/ifl'sto for Philosophy, p. 84, cmphnsis ndclcd.
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Now, given that this list of examples is capacious enough to include
the fundamentalist 'subject' invoked by Ayatollah Khomeini's Islam-
ism and Mao's cultural revolution, it is in truth difficult to see why
Badiou's thought tends to be received as progressive at all. It is IlVllllt
gllrdist, to be sure. But the relationship between aesthetic or conceptual
radicality and political radicality is complicated. The two 'radicalities'
here are in fact nearly as unrelated as the 'states' in set theory and the
modern state apparahlses that evolved in Europe from the sixteenth
cenhlry. More than this, it is difficult to see how we can fail to register
the deep imbrication of his 'politics as thought' with violence.
It is a fallacy to think that because many progressive actions have
involved the violent overthrow of unjust social arrangements, that
political violence per se is progressive. Yet Badiou's set-theoretical
language of 'seizing' or 'forcing' the elements of a situation to attest
to the interpellating event, when we descend from the math, seems
hardly to allow for the widest variety of political applications. It is
even more problematic when it is coupled with Badiou's critique of
discursive democratic will-formation that I have recounted. Badiou
himself pulls no punches when he tries to separate his ethics of the
event from the Nazis' fidelity to their axiomatic naming of the
'Jews' as the enemy. The Carl Schmitt of The Concept of the Politiclll
distinguished 'the political' from the tawdry liberal realities of the
later 1920s by recourse to the decided opposition of friends versus
enemies.129 So too Badiou in The Ethics avows in directly Schmittian
terms that:
Even in this respect [viz. naming an enemy], we have to
recognise that this process mimics an absolute truth process.
Every fidelity to an event names the adversaries of its
perseverance. Contrary to consensulll etllics, which tries to Ilvoid
divisions, the ethic of truths is always militant, combative. For
the concrete manifestation of its heterogeneity to opinions
and established knowledges is the struggle against all sorts
of efforts of interruption, at corruption, at the return to the
immediate interests of the human animal, at the humiliation
and repression of the Immortal who arises as Subject. The
ethic of truths presumes recognition of these efforts, Ilnd thus the
singulllr operation of nllming enemies. l3O
129. C. Schmitt, Tile CII"c,'/,1 ofill<' I'IIlili.:o/, PI" 25-6.
130. B~dioo, Eillics, p. 75, ell1ph~sis ~ddcd; d. Dc"itsch, 'Democrocy's Conlent Thinking Politics
wilh Badioo and Schmitt', PI'. 4H-52.
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This, then, would seem to be the measure of how Badiouian
vanguards can be expected to politically engage with others who
insist that political life is not exhausted by, but neither can it wholly
transcend, our condition as finite discursive human animals. Given
the designation of politics as axiomatic 'thought' in Metapolitics,
Badiou's specification of a defensible democracy, taken in a
'philosophical sense' is hardly less troubling. Democracy, viewed
metapolitically, says Badiou, is a political regime in which 'every
non-egalitarian statement concerning the situation' is not simply
prohibited, but impossible.13 ] The thought here, such as it is, is to
again identify 'the state' with 'repression' or prohibition in a way
that Foucault or Zizek; to cite only two contemporaries, have
shown to be deeply questionable: since their insight has been the
extent to which power produces, as well as says 'no'. As to what
Badiou's 'thought' here might mean if it were ever to inform
historical, political action, we can agree with Badiou that it will
involve a 'different thing altogether' than what modern thought
has tended to associate with political democracy.132
Terror, Badiou argues in his Manifesto for Philosophy, is the
'illegal' fidelity to a substantialization of Truth. In his Ethics, by
contrast, BadiOll stresses that when he talks of 'terror' he does not
mean 'the political concept of Terror, linked (in a universalizable
couple) to the concept of Virtue by the Immortals of the Jacobin
Committee of Public Safety'.133 Hegel, as we might recall here,
agrees that the historical Terror of the Jacobins was not a betrayal
by the Jacobins of the Truth for which they stood. The Terror, Hegel
argued, followed from the ]acobin's attempt to give political form
to a still deeply alienated, Rousseauian conception of thought,
freedom and the human wi11.134 Hegel's thinking about this in
Philosophy of Right section 5 hence becomes remarkable as we try to
come to terms with Badiou's thought about politics, and Badiou's
evident admiration for the short-lived Immortals history knows as
the ]acobins:
If the will determines itself ... [as] this absolute possibility of
abstracting from every determination in which I find myself,
or which 1 have posited in myself, the flight from every
content as a limitation ... this is the freedom of the void,
131. Bndioll, M<'IIlI'"litics, p. '.13.
132. Bndioll, M<'IIlI'"litics, p. 93.
]33. BndiOll, EII/ics, p. 77.
"134. d. Ilndioll, Mt'lil/'Olitics, PI" 46, 54.
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which is raised to the status of an actual shape and passion.
If it remains purely theoretical, it becomes in the religious
realm the Hindu fanaticism of pure contemplation, but if it
turns to actuality, it becomes in the realm of both politics and
religion the fanaticism of destruction, demolishing the whole
existing social order, eliminating all individuals regarded as
suspect by a given order, and annihilating any organisation
which attempts to rise up anew ... It may well believe that it
wills some positive condition, for instance the condition of
universal equality or of universal religious life, but it does
not in fact will the positive actuality of this condition, for this
at once gives rise to some kind of order, a particularisation
both of institutions and of individuals, but it is precisely
through the annihilation of particularity and of objective
determination that the self-consciousness of this negative
freedom arises ... [During] the reign of Terror in the French
Revolution ... all differences of talents and authority were
cancelled out ... For fanaticism wills only what is abstract,
not what is articulated, so that whatever differences emerge,
it finds them incompatible with its own indeterminacy, and
cancels them out ... all institutions are incompatible with the
abstract self-consciousness of equality.135
If the Left is not to repeat itself, or those moments of its history that
today provide such anunlmition for the 'there is no alternative' chorus
from the Right, BadiOlI cannot save us. We need to think again.
Conclusion, or Think Again
The world is too wicked, and does not deserve to have wise
and pious princes. Frogs need storks ...
Martin Luther, 'Secular Authority: The Extent to Which It
should be Obeyed'.
Before we conclude, it is worth emphasizing the nature of this
critique of Badiou, which is an immanent critique. As The LA Times
has remarked, Badiou's gift to the contemporary intellectual
conjuncture is to have made it possible to talk again of philosophy,
and of truth, the good and justice, without which critical thought
135. W. G. F. Hegel, I'hil"~0J'h1jof l<iShl, cd. A. Wood, trons. H. 13. Nisbet, Combridge, COl11bridge
University Pre~~, 1')')1, pp. 3R-9.
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must indeed fall dead.136 Whether the merit of this cause legislates
all of Badiou's conclusions, any more than it would justify a
wholesale adoption of jurgen Habermas or Leo Strauss, is what is
in question. It is only the absence of an adequate reflection on the
relation of this philosophy to poli tics that has been in question in
this article, and - as the corollary of this - an adequately nuanced
philosophy of politics itself.
To restate some old principles: immanent critique in the legacy of
historical marxism set itself to overcome the divisions that
bifurcated earlier modern thought in general. Drawing on Hegel,
Kantian philosophy, as read for instance by Lukacs or Horkheimer,
is the most powerful formalization of a set of unresolvable
divisions between is and ought, fact and value, universal and
particular, theoretical understanding and practical reason. The
means immanent critique used to do this was an historically
grounded social theory that aimed to uncover crisis potentials
within the situation that was being critiqued. Such critical theory
sought to negotiate the intrinsic tension between theOl'in and praxis
- the descent of the philosopher back into the polis137 - by means
of whom it addressed. It addressed those subjects within societies
most historically capable of - because of their functional importance
- and most directly interested in - because of their material
suffering - progressive political change.
In Max Horkheimer's early essays, he conducted a series of
detailed studies of the 'freedom movements' of the early modern
period, from Savaranola and Cola to the jacobins. 138 Horkheimer
argues that historical study of these movements shows that Max
Weber's 'stress on the rationalistic trait of the [modern] bourgeois
mind' is not false. But it is one-sided, 'Irrationalism is from the start
no less associated with its history.'139 From Luther and Machiavelli
onwards, Horkheimer documents, the progressive axioms of the
great liberators of the modern subject have always been coupled
with expressions of a darker nature - particularly sermons and
diatribes denouncing the brutal 'egoism' of human nature,140 Here,
for one example again, is Martin Luther, referring to Paul in order
13(,. LA Till/e" cited on the bock cover of 130dioll, III{illile TIIOIISIII.
137. d. Bodioo, "!Jillile T/IflIlSllt, p. 7IJ.
DR. d. Bodioll, M"tn/,,,Iitics, pp. 124-7, 138.
139. M. Horkheimer, 'E};oism ond Freedom Movements: On the Anthropology of the BOllr};eois
Ern', in Iktlll,"'11 Pllil"s,,/,IIy nlld SIlcinl TIIl'Ilry: Sd"cI,'d Enrly Writillgs, trans. by G. F. Hlinter,
M. S. Krnmer nnd J. 'I"rpey, Cnmbrid};e Mnss., The MIT Press, '19')5, p. 87.
'140. cf. es!,ecinlly, Horkheimer, 'Egoism nnd Freednm Movements', PI'. 75-7.
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to make himself clear about what is to be done with those left
behind by the Christian experience:
[What] is needed in the world is a strict, hard, worldly power
to force and compel the wicked not to take, nor rob, and to
return what they borrow, although a Christian should
neither demand it back nor hope to get it back ... Therefore,
one must keep the streets clean, create peace and enforce law
in the country, and hack away with the sword at violators, as
St Paul teaches at Romans 13:4 ... No one must believe that
the world can be ruled without bloodshed; the secular sword
should and must be red and bloodthirsty ...141
What should we make of this strange, double-sidedness of modern
thought? Here is Horkheimer's assessment:
The reformation, with its morally depressing anti-human
pathos, its hatred for the earthworm's vanity, its dark
doctrine of predestination, is not so much the opponent of
bourgeois humanism as its other, its misanthropic side. It is
humanism for the masses, while humanism itself is the
reformation for the wealthy.142
And how does he, as a critical Marxian, set out to explain this
double-sidedness? Without eschewing the 'problem of truth',143
and carrying out his own sustained criticism of the pragmatists and
historicists of his day, Horkheimer asks about the sociopolitical
conditions that promote this unhappy, divided modern
consciousness. His 'Materialism and Morality' is for this reason one
of the most devastating criticisms of Kant's practical philosophy
ever written. In it, the young Horkheimer argues that the
'insurmountable, properly ontological' division of the modern
subject, that Badiou's Etllics still replicates,144 philosophically
reflects the sociopolitical bifurcations intrinsic to what is today
called 'deregulated' capitalism. In such an atomized society, bound
only by the price mechanism or 'invisible hand':
The social whole lives through the unleashing of the posses-
sive instincts of all individuals. The whole is maintained
141. Horkheimcr, 'Egoism nnd Freedom Movements', p. HI.
142. 1-lorkheirneJ', 'Egoisll1 [jlld Freedom Moverncnts', p. 99.
143. M. Horkhcimer, 'On the Problem of Truth', in Belwel'lI PI, ill/sophy IIlId Social Theory: 5('/l'el,'.,
Early Writ illgs, PI'. 177-216.
144. B"dioll, EII/ies, p. 54.
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insofar as the individuals concern themselves with profit
and the conservation and multiplication of their own
property ... Due to the lack of rational organisation of the
social whole which his labour benefits, [the individual]
cannot recognise himself in his true connection to it and
knows himself only as an individual whom the whole affects
somewhat, without it ever becoming clear how much and in
what manner his egoistic activity actually affects. The whole
thus appears as an admonition and demand which troubles
precisely the progressive individuals at their labour, both in
the call of conscience and in moral deliberation.145
In these alienating sociopolitical conditions, that is, Horkheimer
argues that we should expect that the moral ideals that give form
to the demand of the social whole on the individual will become
increasingly 'overstrain~d'. In their increasingly abstract and
elevated light, the 'egoism' that individuals are economically
stimulated to indulge limitlessly can only appear to them as less
and less ethically redeemable. The sad result of this bitter dialectic
is, then, the systemic cultivation of what Horkheimer calls:
a secret contempt for one's own concrete existence and
hatred for the happiness of others, ... a nihilism which has
expressed itself again and again in the modern age as the
practical destruction of everything joyful and happy, as
barbarity and destruction.146
Is Horkheimer, by questioning the redeemability of calls to self-
overcoming as radical or abstract as Kant's categorical imperative,
really sponsoring what Badiou might call a Thermidorean
reconciliation to 'capital-parliamentarianism'?147 Of course he is
not. Indeed, what critical theory should begin by setting itself
against is all such one-sided denunciations.148 What is suggested by
the young Horkheimer's analysis of the philosophical discourse of
modernity - cited here purely as an example of immanent
historical critique - is this. We should surely think about what we
are leaving behind - from Marx's species-being to its roots in
Aristotle's eudairnonisl1I - if \,ve accept Badiou's position that 'every
145. M. Horkheimer, 'M~teri~lism ~nd Morality', in l3i'1w,','11 I'hil"s"l'hy allli Socinl The"ry: Sl'!ccled
Early Wrilillgs, PI'. 19,20.
146. Horkheimer, 'Egoism ~nd Freedom Movements', p. lOU.
'147. l3~diou, Ml'IlIl",lilics, PI'. '17,1>4,101
'141>. d. B~diou,Ml'IlIl'"lilics, PI" 31-4.
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definition of Man based on happiness is nihilist'.149 We should also
surely ask ourselves whether our 'thought' is giving voice to
anything more noble than the atomization of later capitalist
subjectivity if we accept Badiou's neo-Lutheran thought that the
vast majority of people alive today, or at any time, are
'contemptible, and they will indeed be held ill contempt'.150
Let us conclude by allowing Badiou again to speak for himself.
In his Manifesto for Philosophy, he far from denounces neo-liberal
capitalism outright. Capital is to be 'saluted', he says. The reason is
not that it melts old certainties into air, at the same time forming
new solidarities and making possible unprecedented material
wealth. The reason is that it enacts what he calls a 'destitution' of
the social bond. In typical philosophical clip, he adds that the fact
that this destitution 'operates through the most utter barbarity
cannot disguise its strictly on tological virtue' .151 Divesting
'communism' from any form of historical struggle or the labour
movement, Badiou hence prophecies in 'Politics Unbound' that:
The communists embody the unbound multiplicity of
consciousness, its anticipitory aspect, and therefore the precari-
ousness of the bond [between individuals] rather than its
firmness. It is not for nothing that the maxim of the proletarian
is to have nothing to lose but their chains, and to have the
world to win. It is the bond that we must terminate ...152
More humbly, J submit the thought that, if the 'polyvalent man'
whom Badiou praises here as the 'emblem' of communism is to
flourish, it is difficult to think of a political thought that could be
more untrue.
149. Bodi"u, [I!lit's, p. 57.
150. Bodi"u, Elilies, p. n.
151. BodinLl, Mnlli/i'sloforP!li/oso/,!ly, p. 57; d. J. Borkcr, 'Introduction' to Bod iou, Me/opolil;t's, PI'.
xxi-ii.
152. Bodinll, Me/0l,o/itit's, PI'. 74-5, cl11phosis oddcd.
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